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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
which all have experienced who have had much to do with the
trial of cases," and an expression to practically the same effect
is to be found in the case of Bucher vs. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 139
Wis. 597, in which the court characterizes expert testimony as
"proverbially unreliable at best," although the testimony of physi-
cians especially is not arraigned with that degree of severity which
characterizes the Baxter case above cited. Whether or not the
courts of Wisconsin have not been somewhat severe in their view
of the probative force of expert medical testimony in view of the
opinions of other jurisdictions, is a question; but the fact remains
that expert medical testimony in this state is putting up its last
defense, is being rendered limb from limb and is gradually suc-
cumbing to the force of judicial onslaught.
A HANDY TREATISE UPON THE SUBJECT
OF JUDICIAL NOTICE.
(A paper prepared for the Review by Dr. M. . Clear of the day shift of the
Quick Result Correspondence School.)
I. NOTICE IN GENERAL.
As has perhaps never before been urged, there are several
different kinds of notice in law. Besides the statutory 3-day and
30-day notices to quit or pay rent, which are too intimately known
to the profession at large to deserve more than passing mention
in this treatise, we have to consider the nature and effect of
actual, constructive and judicial notice. Dr. Pomeroy, in his able
and exhaustive work on Equity Jurisprudence has treated the
subjects of actual and constructive notice to such an extent that
it has been thought best not to revive them, but to proceed un-
hindered to the more restricted field of Judicial Notice.
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE-ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY.
After years of unceasing and intensive research into the ar-
chives of the past, together with a careful perusal of the many
cogent and scholarly works on the subject prepared by authors
of no little ability, the writer has been at pains to discover that
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at some remote age-long before the compilers of the Year Books
thought of issuing cumulative digests, a certain conversation took
place at the city of London.
Although the author's conclusions as to the identity of the
principal speaker may well be challenged by learned legal writers,
it is advanced with some degree of certainty that the name of
at least one of the parties to the conversation was "J. S." The
aforesaid J. S., according to the musty records, was a layman,
who, in the course of a conversation with several of his contem-
porary laymen, had occasion to praise the eloquence of a certain
sergeant-at-law to whose acquaintance he laid some claim. He
emphasized particularly the extraordinary powers of persuasion
possessed by the object of his admiration, and said, in part:
"Now wot ye welle, this same barristere might handsomely give
ye beliefe and faythe that blacke were whyte."
The colorful language used by the aforesaid J. S. lived in
the minds of his incredulous hearers, and spread and magnified
until at last the words of praise met the flattered ears of the
barrister himself. Sad to relate, he believed them. Spurred on by
the consciousness that all humans are not entirely unappreciative
of merit, this same good man of the law fairly outdid himself in
the persuading business. So fiery became his eloquence, and so
silvery his soothing words of logic, that it took no time at all for
him to persuade every court in Merry England that black was
white. But pride, unfortunately, too often precedes a fall. It
is narrated in the annals that this honey-tongued pleader found
a time when there were left no more woolsack-warmers to charm.
Here was a plight for the gods-a master salesman who had sold
the bottom out of his own market. The poor man, having found
he could not cure himself of the persuading habit, at length crept
upon himself unaware and-most wondrous of all, succeeded in
persuading himself that black is white. To a man with a mission,
such a state of affairs was unbearable, so he set about directly
to go the rounds of the temples of justice retracing his steps and
persuading them that black is black. For a man with his native
and acquired talents, this was the work of but a week or two.
Having a due regard for method, he brought his second per-
suading-crusade to an end by again convincing himself. Then
came another, and another process of persuading, until at last
the kingdom rocked from its very foundations. No one, in truth,
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knew whether black was white, or black or white. Least of all
was the author of all this confusion able to answer the perplex-
ing problem. Having devoted the best years of a life-time to the
consideration of the subject in all its phases and intricate details,
he felt his great mind tottering, whereupon he purchased a cast-
iron union suit and departed hurriedly for Eastern Wars.
The period that immediately followed upon the barrister's
departure has been rightly termed the darkest part of the Dark
Ages. There is no telling how long the kingdom might have
reeled through an uncertain color riot of black and white, had not
a genius risen to the front with a proffered solution of the great
problem of the day.
His plan, like that of so many latter-day geniuses, was to
arbitrate the whole matter. "Why not cease all strife," he said,
"long enough to definitely agree upon the subject one way or the
other. For it seemeth plain that black is either white or black."
So it was agreed, that in certain cases the courts would admit
for the purposes of argument, that black is black and white is
white.
III. SAME-ITS NATURE.
This was the germ of our present doctrine of judicial notice,
which is nothing more or less than a kind of air-brake to be
applied to legal reasoning-a safety station for use during heavy
professional traffic. It means the admission of the truth of the
one or two self-evident facts in this world which are not flexible
enough to be twisted-but all, it is to be understood-for the
purposes of argument.
IV. SAME-APPLICATION.
Plowing down through the centuries, we arrive at an exami-
nation of the results of the theory of "judicial notice" in our
own day.
One of the greatest changes is, of course, the difference in
the gravity and dignity of the subjects of which our present courts
take judicial notice.
We have progressed, and have left the black-and-white prob-
lem far in the background.
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The Supreme Court of the United States has reached the
sagacious conclusion, as a result of observation, that railroad pas-
senger trains are operated to carry passengers for hire.' The
august tribunal of the State of New Hampshire was on at least
one occasion willing to admit that the state is divided into
counties. 2
Indiana has gone on record as meeting any one half way
on the proposition that leaks in gas pipes require immediate
repair.3
It is judicially noted in New York that the presence of an
undertaker's establishment in a residential portion of the city is
objectionable. 4
Sly old Uncle Sam betrays extraordinary familiarity with
certain subjects of an arduous and spirituous nature when he
confides that "Whiskey is an intoxicating drink-as is also a
whiskey cocktail." 5
V. SAME--WISCONSIN RULINGS.
Lest any one lay the charge against the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin that its members are cold, unsympathetic beings, it
is to be remembered that this court has delivered itself on at-
least two occasions of its observations concerning boys. Most
boys of sixteen, according to the court, are playful and thought-
less and many of them are endowed with a "monkey-like mis-
chievousness" which may be very dangerous.6
So much for the 16-year-olders. It has been laid down by
the Supreme Court of this state that children seventeen months
of age scarcely do more than toddle.7 And it is also declared
that children have a tendency to meddle with a rope and pulley.s
The court judicially knows that a boy about four years of age
can run about four miles an hour.9 ,
I. 32 U. S. App. 182.
2. 40 New Hampshire 420.
3. 14o Indiana 107.
4. 139 N. Y. 93.
5. 75 Federal Rep. 657.
6. 146 Wis. 621.
7. 152 Wis. 68.
8. 152 Wis. 328.
9. 149 N. W. 698.
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Back in territorial days, there was a certain fee of $3.oo in
connection with the courts. According to the Wisconsin court,
those three dollars would be worth about twelve in these days,
as far as purchasing power goes.10 Thus even the high cost
of living has been noticed judicially.
We have the judicial word of the Supreme Court for it that
carbolic acid will burn the skin," and that Richland Center is in
Wisconsin.12
Engine-cabs are not for use by passengers, 13 and it is a
matter of common knowledge that public utilities used to agree
among themselves as to rates to cover the duplication of plants.'
We are told that .*c is a matter of common knowledge that
farmers counsel with their wives and members of their families
on business transactions 15, but not whether they follow the advice
given by the counsellors.
In Wisconsin, complete drunkenness is a defense to a note
in the hands of an innocent purchaser, because the signing of
notes is not the usual and probable result of drunkenness.' 6 The
source or means of information of the court upon this subject is
not disclosed.
io. 149 N. W. 378.
ii. x49 N. W. 476.
12. 63 Wis. 474.
13. 154 N. W. 979.
'4. 145 N. W. 233.
15. 145 N. W. 227.
i6. i42 N. W. 263.
